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there is nothing in the CPLR expressly requiring it. The entire
tenor of the CPLR, on the other hand, is that, in regard to
pleadings, we are today to be influenced more by what the facts
really are than the way in which the pleadings set them down.
Even if, on motion, a complaint is dismissed for failing to
state a cause of action-meaning that the complaint omits entirely
the requisite allegations of the cause of action itself-the court
has power, under CPLR 3211(e), to permit amendment of it,
thereby preserving the action and obviating its commencement
anew. So it should be with jurisdictional allegations, too, especially
where there is no statutory requirement that jurisdictional bases
be alleged in the complaint.
The foregoing conclusions are given strong support by
analogy to federal jurisdictional allegations in pleadings. There,
where allegations to the effect that there is a federal question in
the case or diversity of citizenship are requisite to subject-matter
(not merely to personal) jurisdiction, it is expressly provided by
statute that "defective allegations of jurisdiction may be amended
80

The holding of the instant case may also have the tendency
to discourage that which should surely be encouraged: the service
of the summons and complaint together. The plaintiff serving his
summons alone may amend the complaint to allege CPLR 302
jurisdiction if, when later the complaint is served, the allegations
are defective, or are omitted altogether, while the plaintiff who
serves his summons and complaint together-which service is
surely more convenient to the defendant-is penalized by having
his complaint held unamendable to supply or to correct jurisdictional
allegations. It would be more appropriate to permit the amendment
if the facts of jurisdiction are present.
Section 311 - Personal serice upon a corporation.
Section 311 81 abolishes the distinction that existed under the
CPA between foreign and domestic corporations. It also abolishes
the distinction between classes of persons upon whom service can
be made. Under Section 229(3) of the CPA, service could be
effected on, e.g., a cashier or managing agent only if service
could not be made with due diligence upon an officer of the corporation or upon a person designated by law to accept service
of process.
8028 U.S.C. § 1653 (1948).
81 Section 311 provides that personal service shall be made by delivering
the summons upon any domestic or foreign corporation "to an officer, director,
managing or general agent . . . [or] any other agent authorized by ap-

pointment or by law to receive service. ....
"
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In B & J Bakery, Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 8 2
an action commenced prior to the effective date of the CPLR,
process was served on the executive secretary to the vice-president
in charge of defendant's New York office. Upon being directed
to the secretary, the process server informed her of the nature
of his business. Thereupon, she went into the vice-president's
office and, when she returned, directed the process server to
leave the summons with her. The supreme court denied defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that the executive secretary
could, under the circumstances, be treated as a managing agent.8 3
The appellate division reversed on the ground that there was no
proof that service had been attempted pursuant to subdivisions
(1) and (2) of section 229 or that the secretary was a managing
agent.
The lower court had utilized the reasoning of Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 84 that if the agents' positions are "such as
to lead to a . . . presumption that notice to them will be notice
to the principal, the corporation must submit ....
"
5 On the

facts, it would appear that the lower court reached a reasonable
conclusion and merited affirmance under CPLR 10003, which
governs in transition cases. The facts showed that the secretary
accepted service after conferring with the vice-president, who
was in close proximity at the time service was made, and that as
an executive secretary she was a person entrusted with some
measure of responsibility and discretion. It should not be important, moreover, whether she could be characterized as a
managing agent. Service upon her was, for all intents and
purposes, service upon the vice-president. As stated in Green
v. Morningside Heights Housing Corp.,s6 "where the delivery
is so close both in time and space that it can be classified as a
part of the same act service is effected." 87

8221 App. Div. 2d 783, 250 N.Y.S.2d 562 (2d Dep't 1964).

83B & J
Bakery, Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 40 Misc. 2d
839, 244 N.Y.S.2d 284 (Sup. Ct. 1963). This case was reported in 38 ST.
JoHN's L. REv. 415 (1964).

84220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917); accord, International Business
Machs. Corp. v. Barrett Div. Allied Chem. &.Dye Corp., 16 App. Div. 2d
487, 229 N.Y.S.2d 547 (3d Dep't 1962); Mastan v. Desormeau Dairy-Vend

Serv., Inc., 11 App. Div. 2d 860, 203 N.Y.S.2d 343 (3d Dep't 1960);

Benjamin v. Logan, 34 Misc. 2d 46, 227 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
85 Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 269, 115 N.E. 915, 918
(1917).
8G 13 Misc. 2d 124, 177 N.Y.S.2d 760 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 7 App. Div. 2d
708, 180 N.Y.S.2d 104 (Ist Dep't 1958).
87 Id. at 125, 177 N.Y.S.2d at 761.

